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ABSTRACT
The cost of equity is a measure of the required return by investors. It is desirable for firms, especially banks, to lower the 
cost of equity. There are a number of factors related to the quality of information disclosed that could influence the cost 
of equity. The accounting regulators aim to improve the quality of information by requiring assets to be valued at fair 
value. However the application of fair value accounting potentially increases information asymmetry, especially if fair 
value is estimated and subjected to the judgment of the preparers of financial statements. This asymmetric information 
problem potentially lowers the information quality and increases investors’ estimation risk and thus influences the cost 
of equity capital. Therefore, this research investigates the effect of fair value accounting on the cost of equity capital for 
a sample of Asian banks since banks hold a relatively larger proportion of assets at fair value. Using the generalized 
method of moment model for dynamic panel data, this research finds significant and positive relationship between assets 
at fair value and the cost of equity. The results found are similar for both quoted and unquoted assets. Thus although to 
regulators, fair value accounting provide relevant and timely information to investors, assets at fair value are perceived 
to be risky and as a consequence investors require higher returns.
Keywords: Fair value; cost of equity; information asymmetry; information quality
ABSTRAK
INtRodUctIoN
The cost of equity (COE) is an implied rate of return or 
a measure of the return that investors required. Previous 
research shows that the asymmetric information (Aboody, 
Hughes & Liu 2005; Amihud & Mendelson 1986; Ly 
2010) and information quality (Botosan, Plumlee & Xie 
2004; diamond & Verrechia 1991; Easley, Hvidkjaer & 
o’hara 2002; Francis, LaFond, olsson & Schipper, 2005; 
Francis, Nanda & olsson 2008; Leuz & Verrecchia 2005; 
Lambert, Leuz & Verrecchia 2007; Hail (2002)) influence 
the COE. the asymmetric information problem between 
investors could increase the cost of raising funds and 
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(Perakaunan Nilai Saksama dan Kos Modal Ekuiti Bank-bank Asia)
Kata kunci: Nilai saksama; kos ekuiti; asimetri maklumat; kualiti maklumat
could lead suppliers of capital to reduce the stock price. 
Ly (2010) describes two reasons for this. Information 
asymmetry increases investors’ estimation risk as less 
information and/or poor quality information increases 
uncertainty of firms’ future cash flows estimation. 
Information asymmetry induces adverse selection and in 
turn increases costs of transactions between buyers and 
sellers. Since there is less demand for stocks with high 
transaction costs, firms of such stocks must discount prices 
(translated as higher cost of capital) to induce investors to 
purchase the shares. Fair value accounting provide more 
transparent information to users thus improving the quality 
of information. this in turn reduces COE (diamond & 
Kos ekuiti adalah ukuran pulangan yang dikehendaki oleh pelabur. Adalah wajar untuk firma, terutamanya bank, 
merendahkan kos ekuiti. Terdapat beberapa faktor yang berkaitan dengan kualiti maklumat yang dizahirkan yang boleh 
mempengaruhi kos ekuiti. Pengawal selia perakaunan bertujuan meningkatkan kualiti maklumat dengan memerlukan 
aset dinilai pada nilai saksama. Walau bagaimanapun pemakaian perakaunan nilai saksama berpotensi meningkatkan 
maklumat tak seimbang, terutamanya jika nilai saksama dianggarkan dan tertakluk kepada budi bicara penyedia penyata 
kewangan. Masalah maklumat tak seimbang berpotensi mengurangkan kualiti maklumat dan meningkatkan risiko 
penganggaran pelabur dan dengan itu mempengaruhi kos ekuiti. Oleh itu, kajian ini mengkaji kesan perakaunan nilai 
saksama  pada  kos  modal  ekuiti  untuk  sampel  yang  terdiri  daripada  bank-bank di Asia  kerana  bank  memegang 
sebahagian  yang  agak  lebih  besar  aset  yang  dinilai  saksama. Dengan  menggunakan kaedah  momen teritlak  
untuk  data  panel dinamik, kajian ini mendapati hubungan yang signifikan dan positif antara aset dinilai saksama dan 
kos ekuiti. Dapatan kajian adalah sama untuk kedua-dua aset yang disebut harga dan aset yang tidak disebut harga. 
Oleh itu, walaupun kepada  pengawal  selia,  perakaunan  nilai  saksama  menyediakan  maklumat  yang  relevan  dan 
tepat  pada  masanya kepada  pelabur,  aset  yang  dinilai  saksama  dilihat  sebagai  berisiko  dan  akibatnya  pelabur 
menghendaki  pulangan yang lebih tinggi.
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Verrecchia 1991). Fair value measures are deemed more 
relevant and timely than historical cost measure albeit at 
the expense of reliability, some might argue. Previous 
studies such as christensen and Nikolaev (2013) and Lins, 
Servaes and tamayo (2011) criticise fair value accounting 
in generating information asymmetry problem and risk 
due to the inherent subjectivity and discretion in the 
measurement and hence, increases COE which counters 
the desired outcome. Some other studies reported that the 
notion of fair value accounting introduces more volatility 
in the financial statement (Barth 1994). Furthermore, 
the related International Financial Reporting Standard 
(IFRS) provides managerial flexibility and discretion in 
cases where market values are not available (Ball 2006; 
Schipper 2005).
Nonetheless, the criticisms of fair value accounting 
are largely directed towards accounting for unquoted fair 
valued assets (Liao, Kang, Morris & tang 2010; Li 2010). 
Managers use estimation models for unquoted fair valued 
assets which may introduce, as a result, estimation risk 
from intentional or unintentional errors and information 
asymmetry issues as managers have more information 
regarding the value of these assets. Unquoted fair valued 
assets are more likely to influence COE compared to quoted 
fair valued assets. thus, this research examine whether the 
subjectivity and discretionary nature of the measurements 
under fair value accounting introduce information risk and 
consequently increase COE. this research focuses on banks 
as banks hold substantial amount of fair valued assets. 
Generally, the results indicate that fair valued assets 
in total, unquoted fair valued assets and quoted fair valued 
assets individually increases the COE after taking into 
account other risk factors such as size, beta and book to 
market ratio. this is an important contribution towards the 
body of knowledge as previous study such as christensen 
and Nikolaev (2013) focuses on non-financial assets or 
employs a survey method (Lins et al 2011). By testing the 
effect of fair value accounting on the COE, the research 
addresses directly the asymmetric information problem 
with regards to fair value accounting. theoretically this 
research affirms Armstrong, core, taylor and Verrecchia 
(2011) theoretical assertion that the relationship between 
information asymmetry and COE is likely to be found in 
imperfect market such as in Asia. this is further explained 
in the methodology section. 
This paper proceeds as follows: the section 
immediately follows provides literature review related to 
this research, while the methodology section discusses 
the sample selection, research model and the generalized 
method of moment (GMM). the section that follows 
presents the results and discusses the findings of the 
study. the paper finally concludes the research finding 
and presents limitations of the study and possible avenues 
for further research.
LItERAtURE REVIEW
FAIR VALUE AccoUNtING
For the purpose of this research and discussion fair value 
accounting means measuring assets/liabilities at fair 
value. the adoption of fair value measurement moves 
accounting practice away from the established concepts 
of historical cost and stewardship towards the concepts 
of investor decisions based on future cash flows and fair 
value. the International Financial Reporting Standard 
(IFRS) 13 Fair Value (IFRS 2011:13) defined fair value as” 
the price that would be received to sell an asset or paid 
to transfer a liability in an orderly transaction between 
market participants at the measurement date.” Further 
IFRS 13 prescribes a framework for performing fair value 
measurements using a three-tiered hierarchy of inputs. 
the main purpose of the three-tiered hierarchy of inputs 
is to increase consistency and comparability in fair value 
measurements (Fahnestock & Bostwick 2011). Level 
1 fair value estimates “are observable inputs based on 
quoted market prices for identical assets and liabilities” as 
given in IFRS 13 (IFRS 2011: 10) and has been used in this 
present research as quoted fair valued assets. Level 1 fair 
value is most applicable to those assets or liabilities that 
are actively traded (chea 2011). Level 2 fair value inputs 
are quoted prices from sources other than Level 1 which 
are observable either directly or indirectly. Estimates are 
based on quoted market prices of similar or related assets 
and liabilities. 
Level 3 is defined in IFRS 13 (IFRS 2011: 33) as 
“unobservable inputs for the asset or liability.” Level 3 fair 
value is computed by using price models or discounted 
cash flow methodologies or other information reflecting 
a reporting entity’s own assumptions and judgments 
in assigning the asset or liability. Level 3 should only 
be used if level 1 or 2 estimates are not available, no 
readily available markets exist or with quoted values 
on measurement dates that fall during periods of market 
illiquidity or volatility (Verdi 2006). this research 
classifies fair valued assets using level 2 and 3 inputs as 
unquoted fair valued assets as in the sample period the 
three-tiered hierarchy of inputs is not applicable yet.
ARGUMENtS FoR ANd AGAINSt FAIR VALUE AccoUNtING
Advocates of fair value accounting argues that fair value 
measurement is the best measure that allows investors 
to evaluate companies and make decisions based on up 
to date information (Ball 2006; Fahnestock & Bostwick 
2011; cherry & Hague 2009). Fair value measurement in 
recent standard focuses on market-based exchange values 
instead of entity-based values claiming that such treatment 
allows investors to see what is inside the company when 
economic conditions change (Fahnestock & Bostwick 
2011). thus, fair value accounting is encouraged as a 
means of enhancing transparency to investors (chasan 
2008). Since fair value accounting provides information 
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about current and future condition of an entity, it helps 
investors in making their own prediction and in confirming 
or correcting their earlier expectations (Barth, Landsman 
& Wahlen 1995; Kuhrana & Kim 2003). 
Barth (1994), Willis (2002) and danbolt and Rees 
(2008) assert that information about financial assets 
and liabilities based on fair value measurement is more 
relevant than amounts based on their historical cost. 
Historical cost method is viewed as having a significantly 
lower degree of comparability (Georgiou & Jack 2011). 
Investors are concerned with value, not costs, so reporting 
assets/liabilities at historical prices become irrelevant in 
assessing an entity’s current financial position (Penman 
2007) with the passage of time.
However, there is an element of discretion in 
determining fair value which reduces the reliability of 
asset measurement compared to historical cost. the key 
issue is whether fair value accounting can be measured 
reliably for financial instruments which are not traded 
in competitive and liquid form, for example, specialized 
receivables or non-standardized loans (Khan 2014). 
Nissim (2003) reported that the reliability of loan at fair 
value is lower for less healthy banks, since banks mangers 
may overstate fair value in an attempt to influence the 
market’s perception of their risk and performance. on 
the other hand, fair value of available –for-sale securities 
which are more actively traded in a well-established 
market, explain equity values better than historical cost. 
therefore, fair value accounting is more relevant when 
objective market determined fair value is available. 
However, in established market, the bid-ask spread 
can be large enough to cause substantial uncertainty about 
fair value accounting and hence introduce noise in the 
financial statements (Ball 2006). Ball (2006) argued that 
in illiquid markets, there is a potential for managers to 
influence quoted prices if the trading is performed by them. 
consequently this allows them to manipulate fair value 
estimates especially when ‘mark to model’ accounting 
is employed to simulate market prices, since managers 
can impact both the choice of models and the parameter 
estimates. However, if liquid market prices are available, 
fair value accounting decreases opportunities for self-
interested managers to impact the financial statements by 
exercising their discretion over realizing gains and losses 
through the timing of asset sales (Ball 2006).
Many bank managers express concern that users will 
be misled (Barth et al. 1995), because earnings numbers 
based on fair value for investment securities are likely to 
be more volatile than those based on historical cost. this 
increased volatility is not only reflective of the underlying 
economic volatility of banks’ operations, but inefficient 
capital allocation decisions by investors will result, thus 
raising banks’ COE. Also, increased use of fair value 
measurement will result in financial statements reflecting 
more inherent volatility and, likely, more estimation 
error volatility Livne, Markarian and Milne (2011).Vera 
and Renato (2012) document that investors are aware of 
estimation errors and, therefore, assign less relevance to 
numbers which are less trustworthy and less reliable in 
fair valued assets because these investors expected a high 
information risk, inherent estimation errors and possible 
reporting bias exist with these numbers. 
the error and uncertainty is also one of the main 
concerns under the three levels of hierarchy particularly 
in Level 3 inputs (Lefebvre, Simonova & Scarlett 2009). 
Managers have the ability to exercise a degree of discretion 
over it, so, managers are more likely to generate intentional 
biases in their estimations (Aboody et al. 2005; Bartov, 
Mohanram & Nissim 2007). the expected presence of 
intentional error and unintentional error especially in 
levels 3 fair valued assets are expected to influence the 
reliability and transparency of financial information. 
Unintentional error comes from the controlling system, 
environment and other factors (Fahnestock & Bostwick 
2011). Unintentional or the noise error also comes from 
estimating market value. Intentional error may come 
from management purpose or intention (Valencia 2011), 
because, the manager revalue the assets ex post after 
they know the effect of the fair value estimate on the 
financial statements. For instance, managers may only 
revalue assets when they intend to manipulate reported 
performance (Nissim 2003). Alternatively, managers 
may revalue assets when reliable fair value estimates 
are available as reported by christensen and Nikolaev 
(2013). to the extent that these biases are expected on 
average, investors are likely to adjust such estimates in 
valuing the firm.
FAIR VALUE AccoUNtING, INFoRMAtIoN ASYMMEtRY 
AND THE COE
In general, accounting information facilitates investors in 
their assessment of firms’ future cash flows, consequently 
risk and the return they required of firms. thus in order 
to examine the consequences of applying fair value 
accounting, this research examine its effect on the cost 
of equity. COE is “the expected return on the firm’s equity 
capital that equates the firm’s stock price at the beginning 
of the period to the expected cash flow investors receive 
at the end of the period” (Biddle, Hilary & Verdi 2009; 
Botosan & Plumlee 2005). Munteanu (2011) defines the 
COE from the firm perspective as the cost on companies for 
obtaining funds. From the investors’ perspective, COE is 
the return that investors expect. If investors are uncertain 
of a firm’s future cash flows, as a result of poor accounting 
information, they are likely to use a higher discount rate to 
price the firm’s equity. this research adopts this concept 
of COE.
Information asymmetry, that is when different levels 
of information exist between managers and investors, and 
between buying and selling investors, influences the COE. 
Information asymmetry problem increases transaction 
costs resulting in low market liquidity as a result of low 
demand from the investors for stocks with high cost of 
transaction (diamond & Verrecchia 1991). the COE is 
also higher because the company gives a discount to 
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compensate for the investors’ reluctance to retain their 
portfolio stocks with low market liquidity (Ly 2010).
the influence of firm specific information on firm’s 
cost of capital is the subject of a number of theoretical 
papers: diamond and Verrechia (1991), Easley and o’Hara 
(2004), Leuz and Verrecchia (2005) and Lambert et al 
(2007). diamond and Verrechia (1991) builds a model 
that focus on information effect and their result shows 
the beneficial effect of public information in reducing 
information asymmetry, the cost of equity and future risk. 
But their result is expected to be found with large firm and 
when no one has private information about these firms. 
Easley and o’Hara (2004) examines the relation 
between the relative proportion of public and private 
information with COE. they argue that less informed traders 
are less likely to hold assets. Less informed investors 
perceive the stocks to be risky due to the information risk 
and thus they demand higher returns to compensate for this 
extra risk. So investors received lower return for stocks 
when they hold greater private information and less public 
information because this private information impose risk 
on less informed investors and they are not able to adjust 
their investment as informed investors. More importantly 
for the purpose of this research, their analysis concludes 
that firm’s choice of accounting treatment, among others, 
could influence its COE.
Leuz and Verrecchia (2005) develops a model to 
explain the effect of information quality on the COE 
through its effect on expected cash flows. they assumed 
firms’ investment opportunities are observable to investors 
as firms report them to investors. So, mangers are expected 
to select projects that maximize market value and given 
that the firms report to the investors, the quality of report 
affects investment choice, which in turn affects the level 
of expected cash flows. 
Lambert et al. (2007) analyzes the quality of 
accounting information effect on COE and found that 
directly, quality of accounting information influences COE 
since an improvement in information quality decreases 
non-diversifiable risk and affects the assessed covariance 
between a firm’s cash flow with other firms’ cash flows. 
Indirectly, the quality of accounting information influences 
COE since information quality can change a firm’s real 
decisions (regarding production or investment) through 
the end-of-period expected cash flows.
these theoretical papers form a basis for why 
information risk can potentially be priced and determine 
the COE. consistent with this idea, many empirical research 
explore the effect of information quality/risk or information 
asymmetry on asset returns or the COE using different 
proxies of information quality or risk and required return. 
Aboody et al. (2005) reports a positive relationship between 
information asymmetry, using earnings quality, and COE. 
Li and Shroff (2010) measure the asymmetric information 
by calculating bid-ask spread. Armstrong et al. (2011) use 
accounting data that are associated with higher information 
asymmetry. Ashbaugh, collins and LaFond (2004) also 
find that COE is low for company reporting higher quality 
information through capital accruals and transparent 
earnings. Francis et al. (2005) find that information risk 
increases the COE through accruals quality in firm and 
they differentiate between accruals quality determined 
by economic fundamentals and management discretions. 
And accruals quality has been used in their paper because 
it is a proxy for the information risk that is associated with 
earnings. thus the link between accounting information and 
COE of firms is considered as one of the most fundamental 
issues in accounting and standard setters too frequently 
refer to it (Lambert et al. 2007). 
In summary pervious research establish the impact of 
both the asymmetric information and information quality 
on COE. In other words these theoretical and empirical 
researches show that information risk is a risk factor that 
could affect the COE. this study takes cognizance of these 
research findings in conjecturing the information risk in 
fair valued assets and consequently its effect on COE. the 
information risk arises as the shareholders do not have 
the full information regarding the evaluation; especially 
in unquoted asset fair valued assets. So the level of the 
managerial discretion and manipulation with unquoted 
asset at fair value are expected to be high (Acharya & 
Yorulmazer 2002). Nissim (2003) also states that the fair 
values are associated with potential unreliability when 
there are no market prices for the asset or liability. So, 
the reliability cost of fair value estimates is compounded 
by the problem that in the absence of active markets 
for a particular financial instrument, management must 
estimates fair value, which can be subject to discretion or 
manipulation (Landsman 2005). Even though assets and 
liabilities measured at the Level 2 fair value are considered 
more reliable than Level 3 fair value, they are not without 
risk. the inputs or the prices used might be inferred from 
an index, another security with similar attributes to the 
one being measured (chea 2011) or estimation model 
(Liao et al. 2010), and thus still involve some managerial 
judgement and discretion. Without reliable accounting 
information the ability of investors to monitor managerial 
behaviour is reduced; hence investors lose their ability 
to link manager activities to firm performance and value 
(Biddle et al. 2009; Hope & thomas 2008; Vera & Renato 
2012). So, the ability to obtain reliable fair value estimates 
is more closely related to the existence of liquid markets 
for assets, which provide an independent source of 
verification (Watts 2006). Accordingly, the Level 1 inputs 
based on quoted prices are considered as most transparent 
and reliable as compared to Level 2 and 3 which has 
been classed together as unquoted asset at fair value in 
this research. Fair value accounting is also influenced by 
intentional and unintentional error. Intentional estimation 
error arises from incentives to manage earnings, and 
unintentional error arises from management lapses and 
environmental uncertainty (Francis et al. 2005) and it is 
a real possibility. thus given the compelling arguments 
of the information risk in the specific case of adopting fair 
value accounting, this research will focus on the influence 
of fair value accounting on COE.
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RESEARcH MEtHodoLoGY
PoPULAtIoN ANd SAMPLE 
the population for this study is listed banks in Asia. 
this study focuses on banks as banks have substantial 
proportion of fair valued assets. Armstrong et al 
(2011) shows that the relationship between asymmetric 
information and COE is more likely in imperfect markets. 
Armstrong et al (2011) found information asymmetry 
among investors positively affects COE when markets are 
imperfect and this relationship depends on the nature of the 
market. Armstrong et al (2011) refers to perfect market as 
when investors are price takers and the number of traders 
is essentially large or infinite. As a result, this research 
selects sample of banks in Asian market since this best 
present imperfect market. 
We draw the sample from population of largest Asian 
(top five in each country or less depending on availability) 
banks listed on the stock exchange of each country for 
the period 2007 – 2013 because these large banks are the 
ones holding large assets (especially fair valued assets ) 
and have resources to improve their information quality 
and practices. We began our sample from 2007 as these 
big banks start disclosing unquoted fair valued assets and 
quoted fair valued assets in that year. thus the effective 
date of application of the standard is not relevant for the 
purpose of our study. In 2007, companies are allowed to 
practice fair value measurement for all financial assets 
and liabilities (Fahnestock & Bostwick 2011; Li 2010). 
Beck, demirgüç-Kunt and Peria (2008) and caprio and 
Klingebiel (1996) use the same method to choose their 
sample.
this sample is unbalanced in the sense that not all 
banks are observed in each year, although they are all 
observed for at least five to four years in order to have 
appropriate number of lags as an explanatory variable. 
this is to solve data reduction problem due to the adoption 
of lagged values in the dynamic GMM estimations. 
the relevant data was extracted from thomson 
dataStream and annual reports. Initial data collection 
yielded an initial sample of 995 bank-year observations. 
the sample size was subsequently reduced to 509 for a 
number of reasons. Some financial reports could not be 
obtained for different reasons such as financial reports 
were not in the English language and financial reports were 
unavailable. Some banks are deleted due to the missing 
data required to estimate COE and fair valued assets. 
In addition the sample to test the relationship between 
quoted and unquoted fair valued assets and COE consists 
of unbalanced panel of 471 banks -year observations. 
the final sample involved 114 banks from 26 countries 
in Asia (table 1). 
RESEARcH ModEL
The relationship between FVA and COE is expressed in 
the following equation:
COEit = α0 + β1COEi,t–1 + β2FVAi,t + β3BETAi,t + 
 β4BMVi,t+ β5SIZEi,t + ηi + νi,t  (1)
Where:
COEit  = cost of equity capital of bank i at time t, this 
is calculated as t 2 t+
per share at time t+1 and t+2 . 
   Pit is share price of bank i at time t.
COE
it-1 
= the cost of equity of bank i at time t-1 
FVAit  = fair valued assets measured as the proportion 
of assets at fair value over total assets 
BETA
i,t 
= the systematic risk and the value is extracted 
from thomson dataStream,
BMVit  = ratio of book to market value 
SIZEit  = the natural logarithm of total assets.
TABLE 1. List of countries and number of banks 
in the sample
 Countries No of Banks
1 United Arab Emirates 5
2 Bahrain 3
3 Kuwait 5
4 Qatar 5
5 oman 5
6 Saudi Arabia 5
7 Malaysia  5
8 china 5
9 Hong Kong 5
10 Indonesia  5
11 Japan  5
12 Philippine 5
13 Singapore 3
14 Korea 4
15 taiwan 5
16 thailand  5
17 Vietnam 5
18 Jordan 4
19 India  4
20 Israel 4
21 Kazakhstan 2
22 Lebanon 2
23 Pakistan 5
24 Russia 4
25 Sir Lanka 4
26 turkey 5
  114
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   EPS
t+1
 and EPSt+2 are forecasted earnings 
(EPS EPS 1)/Pit
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RESEARcH FINdINGS
dEScRIPtIVE StAtIStIcS
table 2 presents the descriptive statistics of variables. the 
dependent variable COE ranged from 0 to 0.58 with a mean 
of 0.13, and standard deviation of 0.10. A mean (median) 
cost of equity of 13.9% (11.2%) is similar to estimates 
used in other studies. the mean and median for this study 
is similar to the value presented in Botosan (1997) and 
Francis et al. (2005). these summary statistics indicate 
that our sample bank costs of equity estimates are in line 
with past researches. 
this measurement of COE is found to be stable and 
valid (Botosan & Plumlee 2005).
 
the error term (εi) is a 
function of the firm specific effect (ηi) and time specific 
effect (ν
i,t
).  εi = ηi + νi,t, represent error term which is 
assumed to be based on unobserved firm specific effect 
that cause heterogeneity in COE
i,t
 and ν
i,t
 represents 
remainder stochastic disturbance term that is assumed to 
be identical and independently distributed with mean zero 
and the variance σ2
ν
.
Including the lag of COE implies that the current COE is 
influenced by the past COE. this indicates that the baseline 
model in equation (1) is a dynamic panel data model. the 
dynamic panel data has been used in many studies, for 
example Karim et al. (2013), Karim and Saini (2013), 
and Karim and Zaidi (2015). the inclusion of lagged of 
COE in the baseline model in equation (1) implies that 
there is a correlation between the regressors and the error 
term since the lagged of COE depend on error term ε
i–1
. 
therefore, due to this correlation, the dynamic panel data 
estimation in equation (1) suffers from Nickel (1981) bias, 
which disappears only if t is large or approaches infinity. 
Arellano and Bond (1991) proposed a generalized method 
of moments (GMM) estimators to address the endogeneity 
problem (the correlation between the lagged dependent 
variable and the error term). this estimator was then 
extended by Arelano and Bover (1995) and Blundel and 
Bond (1998).
In order to remove bank-specific effect (ηi) in equation 
(1), Arelano and Bover (1995) proposed a forward 
TABLE 2. descriptive statistics
Stats coE FVA QFVA UFVA BEtA BtM SIZE
Mean 0.13 0.20 0.13 0.08 1.00 0.85 8.6
Median 0.11 0.11 0.05 0.02 1.03 0.72 8.51
Min 0.00 2.62E-07 7.81E-08 1.29E-09 0.04 0.00 5.98
Max 0.58 0.98 0.95 0.86 1.88 3.70 11.46
Skewness 2.44 1.93 2.66 3.55 -0.27 2.16 0.14
Kurtosis 10.56 5.73 9.57 16.13 3.78 10.17 2.96
Std. dev. 0.10 0.26 0.21 0.16 0.32 0.57 1.27
Note: coE = cost of equity, FVA = Fair valued assets, QFVA = Quoted fair valued assets, UFVA = Unquoted fair valued assets, Beta = Systematic risk, BtM = Book
 to market ratio, SIZE = natural logarithm of total assets
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orthogonal deviation transformation. this transformation 
essentially subtracts the mean of future observations 
available in the sample from the first t-1 observations. Its 
main advantages is to preserve sample size in panel with 
gaps. this method of transformation has been used by 
previous study, for example Karim et al. (2013), Karim and 
Saini (2013), and Karim and Zaidi (2015). All variables 
in this paper are potentially endogenous and they are 
related to transformed error term. So, all variable present 
in equation have been assumed and treated as endogenous 
variables. As result the GMM model assumptions could be 
written as presented in equation (2) – (6).
E | COE
i,t
(εi)| = 0 for all s ≥ t but E | COEi,t(εi)| ≠ 0
  for s < t ............................................................ (2)
E | FVA
i,t
(εi)| = 0 for all s ≥ t but E | FVAi,t(εi)| ≠ 0
  for s < t ............................................................ (3)
E | BETA
i,t
(εi)| = 0 for all s ≥ t but E | BETAi,t(εi)| ≠ 0
  for s < t ............................................................ (4)
E | BtM
i,t
(εi)| = 0 for all s ≥ t but E | BtMi,t(εi)| ≠ 0
  for s < t ............................................................ (5)
E | SIZE
i,t
(εi)| = 0 for all s ≥ t but E | SIZEi,t(εi)| ≠ 0
  for s < t ............................................................ (6)
The reliability of the GMM estimates is tested by
 the Sargan test with null hypothesis of a correct model
 specification and valid over identifying restrictions
 (Beltratti & Paladino 2013). And it tests if the instruments
 as a group are exogenous. If the moment condition holds,
 then the instrument is valid and model correctly specified.
 therefore, the higher the p-value of Sargan statistics the
 better it is. the test for AR (1) should reject null of no first
 different order serial correlation. Nevertheless, the test
 for AR (2) should not reject null of no second order serial
 correlation test in dynamic model. 
131Fair Value Accounting and the Cost of Equity Capital of Asian Banks
the proportion of fair valued assets to total assets 
range between 2.62E-07 and 0.98, with mean of 0.20 
and standard deviation of 0.26. Whilst, the proportion 
of quoted fair valued assets range between 7.81E-06 and 
0.95, with mean of 0.13 and standard deviation of 0.21. 
the proportion of unquoted fair valued assets range 
between 1.29E-09 and 0.86, with mean of 0.08 and 
standard deviation of 0.16. As a whole banks hold a higher 
proportion of quoted fair valued assets than unquoted fair 
valued assets.
Beta ranges from 0.04 to 1.88 with mean 1.01 and 
standard deviation of 0.32. the mean of beta has a value 
slightly higher than one, indicating that the samples 
have an average total market risk slightly over the stock 
market. And the minimum, maximum, mean and standard 
deviation for book to market ratio is 0.00, 3.70, 0.85 and 
0.57 respectively. the standard deviations of the dependent 
and explanatory variables show large variation.
BIVARIAtE ANALYSIS 
table 3 shows a significant correlation between the 
dependent variable COE and all of the control variables. 
However, the relationship between independent variables 
fair valued assets and COE is not significant. But the 
correlation between fair valued assets and other risk 
factors such as beta and BtM and size are positive and 
significant and this positive and significant relationship 
indicates the riskiness of this asset.
However, the correlation between quoted fair valued 
assets (table 3) and risk factors such as beta, book to 
market ratio and size are positive and significant. the 
correlation between unquoted fair valued assets and 
risk factors are not significant. It is possible that the 
insignificant correlation between fair valued assets with 
COE arises as the bivariate analysis ignores the potential 
influence of any correlation among explanatory variables 
as Botosan and Pulmee (2002) discussed.
TABLE 3. correlation between variables
Stats coE FVA QFVA UFVA BEtA BtM SIZE
coE 1      
FVA -0.03 1     
 (0.36)      
QFVA 0.03 - 1    
 0.38      
UFVA -0.05 - -0.01 1   
 0.12  (0.75)    
BEtA -0.13*** 0.08*** 0.12*** -0.00 1  
 (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.79)   
BtM 0.48*** 0.09*** 0.11*** 0.05 -0.08*** 1 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.15) (0.02)  
SIZE 0.09*** 0.07** 0.11*** -0.01 0.15*** 0.07** 1
 (0.01) (0.05) (0.0) (0.68) (0.00) (0.03)
Notes: coE = cost of equity, FVA = Fair valued assets, QFVA = Quoted fair valued assets, UFVA = Unquoted fair valued assets, Beta = Systematic risk, BtM = Book
 to market ratio, SIZE = natural logarithm of total assets.
 the figures in italics in parenthesis are the probabilities. 
 *** Significant at 1% level 
 ** Significant at 5% level
MULtIVARIAtE ANALYSIS
Fair valued assets variable (FVA), together with risk 
factors; beta, book to market ratio and size are regressed 
first on COE using GMM. Secondly, the fair value assets is 
then split into quoted and unquoted assets (QFVA and UFVA) 
and together with other control variables are regressed on 
COE using GMM. the correlations between the independent 
variables are not harmful and it are not too high. Another 
method to assess multicollinearity is VIF which is the 
inverse of the tolerance. the VIF in table 4 and 5 have 
values less than 10, which indicate that the correlation is 
small and suggests no possibility of the multicollinearity 
problem according to Pallant (2007) and tabachnick and 
Fidell (2007). 
outlier data were removed by winsorizing 1% cut off 
to eliminate the effects of outlier issues as recommended 
by McLean, Pontiff and Watanabe (2009), Aboody (2009) 
and Hail (2002). Moreover, this winsorizing method has 
ability to save the quantity of sample comparing with 
other method. And it can be observed that the removing 
of outlier was advisable by comparing the skewness and 
kurtosis, minimum and maximum (tabachnick & Fidell 
2007). 
on the normality of data issue, according to the 
central limit theorem the mean of the sampling distribution 
for large sample size approaches the population mean. 
tabachnick and Fidell (2007) and Ghasemi and Zahediasl 
(2012) stated that normality tests could reject the null 
of normal distribution for large samples such as in this 
study. Because the actual size is more important than the 
significant level of skewness and the influence of departure 
from zero kurtosis also diminishes.
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tables 6 provide the results of the multivariate 
analysis. the reliability of the GMM estimates is tested 
using the Sargan test. the model passes the requirement 
with a p-value of 0.10 in table 6. For the second model 
when fair valued assets is divided into quoted fair valued 
assets and unquoted fair valued assets the p-value is 0.27 
as shown in table 6. this indicates that the instruments 
are valid.
And lastly, the research tests the autocorrelation AR 
(1) and AR (2). the resulting p-value of 0.001 and 0.21 for 
test AR (1) and AR (2) indicate that estimates of the dynamic 
panel related to fair valued assets do not suffer from first 
and second order- serial correlation (table 6). Similarly, 
the results (table 6) found AR (1) = (0.00) and AR (2) = 
(0.18) for the second model related to quoted fair valued 
assets and unquoted fair valued assets. thus the results 
show that all assumptions are valid and that the results 
obtained under the dynamic model are acceptable.
dIScUSSIoN
the results found positive and significant relationship 
between fair valued assets and COE at 5% significant 
level (table 6). this implies that high fair valued assets 
in banks indicates high asset risk, which, therefore, leads 
to a high COE. Fair valued assets generally introduces 
more volatility in the financial statement and generates 
information asymmetry problem (Barth 1994). So, high 
fair valued assets indicate a high likelihood of error either 
intentional or unintentional. this information asymmetry 
in risky asset is expected to lead to a large probability of 
TABLE 4. VIF values for equation 1 analysis using fair valued 
assets as independent variable
Variable VIF 1/VIF
BEtA 1.04 0.95
SIZE 1.04 0.96
BtM 1.03 0.97
FVA 1.02 0.97
Mean VIF 1.03 
TABLE 5. VIF values for equation 1 analysis using quoted and 
unquoted fair valued assets as independent variables
Variable VIF 1/VIF
BEtA 1.05 0.95
SIZE 1.04 0.95
QFVA 1.04 0.96
BtM 1.03 0.97
UFVA 1 0.99
MEAN VIF 1.03
TABLE 6. Results for equation 1 analysis (with the constant 0)
 FVA
i,t
 as independent variable QFVA
i,t
 and UNQFVA
i,t
 as independent variables
 EXPEctEd SIGN coEFFIcIENt EXPEctEd SIGN EXPEctEd SIGN 
  (P-VALUE)  (P-VALUE)
COE
i,t–1
   0.10**  0.35**
  (0.04)  (0.04)
FVA
i,t
 (+) 0.10**  -
  (0.02)  
QFVA
i,t
   (+) 0.11*
    (0.08)
UFVA
i,t
   (+) 0.27*
    (0.09)
BETA
i,t
 (+) 0.09 (+) 0.04
  (0.36)  (0.68)
BtM
i,t
  (+) 0.03** (+) 0.02**
  (0.02)   (0.09)
SIZE
i,t
  (-) -0.14*** (-) -0.12***
  (0.00)  (0.01)
Number of observations  509  471
observations per group  115  110
Number of instruments  15  18
AR(1)  0.00  0.00
AR(2)  0.21  0.18
Sargan test   0.102  0.27
Notes: coE =cost of equity, FVA = Fair valued assets, QFVA= Quoted fair valued assets, UFVA= Unquoted fair valued assets, Beta = Systematic risk, BtM = Book
 to market ratio, SIZE = natural logarithm of total assets.
 the figures in italics in parenthesis are the probabilities. 
 *** Significant at 1% level 
 ** Significant at 5% level
 * Significant at 10% level
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risk that is a large risk premium. A large risk premium 
requires a large expected rate of return by the banks’ 
investors. 
therefore, the results and discussions indicate that 
information asymmetry as proxied by fair value accounting 
is consistent with previous studies such as Aboody et al. 
(2005), Armitage and Marston (2008), Armstrong et al. 
(2011), Bertomeu, Beyer and dye (2011), Easley and 
o’Hara (2004), Easley et al. (2002), Francis et al. (2005), 
Francis et al. (2008), Lambert et al. (2007), Lambert, Leuz. 
and Verrecchia (2012), and Leuz and Verrecchia (2005). 
these previous studies in the same manner conclude the 
influence of quality of information in various forms and 
asymmetric information on COE. 
the control variables book to market and size that 
are risk factors in the GMM model are consistent with 
the hypotheses and expectation as shown in table 6. the 
BtM is significant and positively related to the COE. this 
result in BtM is consistent with previous studies such as 
as ohlson and Juettner-Nauroth in 2005. However beta 
although positive is insignificant. Gebhardt, Lee and 
Swaminathan (2001) and Hail (2002) document some 
issues under beta that could make beta to be poorly suited 
for testing the influence of factors in COE. the lack of 
significance in beta is not surprising since, Allee (2008) 
reported the same issues. Size is another control variable 
that is significantly and negatively related to the COE. this 
result in size is also consistent with previous studies such 
as Hail and Leuz (2004) and Botosan (1997). 
QUotEd FAIR VALUEd ASSEtS ANd UNQUotEd FAIR 
VALUEd ASSEtS 
Equation 1.0 is run again with the fair valued assets 
separated into quoted fair valued assets and unquoted 
fair valued assets. the results are given in table 6. Since 
for the period under study not all banks disclose FVA into 
categories: level 1, 2 and 3, the level 1 fair valued assets 
are classed as quoted and level 2 and 3 are together classed 
as unquoted. As a result the number of observations is 
also reduced. the results found positive and significant 
relationship between each of quoted FVA and unquoted 
FVA with COE even though in both cases they are weakly 
significant at 10% significant level. 
this means that the effects of fair value measurements 
on COE are similar between quoted and unquoted ones 
even though arguably risk and issues in asset at quoted 
fair values are different from those in assets at unquoted 
fair value. However, the coefficient value of unquoted 
fair valued assets (0.27) is higher than quoted fair valued 
assets (0.11). there are many researchers who document 
the critic of using the fair value measurement without 
differentiating between the different levels of inputs into 
the measurement such as Barth et al. (1995) Livne et al. 
(2011) Barth and Landsman (2010) and Vera and Renato 
(2012). So this significant relation between variables 
indicated that fair value accounting in total will influence 
the COE, even if it is quoted in the market. 
All the control variables that are risk factors in 
the GMM model were consistent with the hypotheses, 
expectations and previous studies as presented in table 
6. the book to market ratio is significant and positively 
related to COE at the 0.09 level. And beta is also positive 
although weakly significant. Size is other control variable 
that is significantly and negatively related to COE at the 
0.01 level. Generally, the results of this study support 
the hypotheses and previous studies that criticise the 
practice of fair value accounting. Results from this GMM 
analysis suggest a high fair valued assets is associated 
with high estimated cost of equity when all risk factors 
are included. 
coNcLUSIoN
this research finds high fair valued assets, indicating high 
information risk, leads to high COE. It could be inferred that 
the high information risk is from asymmetric information 
issues related to fair value accounting. Additionally, the 
empirical research also finds positive and significant 
relationship between each of the quoted and unquoted 
assets at fair value and the COE even though the unquoted 
fair valued assets draws more criticisms than the quoted 
ones. this positive and significant GMM results for both 
quoted and unquoted assets at fair value suggest that 
the market finds in general assets at fair value poses 
information risk which lead to high COE. the market 
derived prices do not mitigate the risk and influence on 
COE. thus although to regulators, FV accounting provide 
relevant and timely information to investors, fair valued 
assets are perceived to be risky and as a consequence 
investors require higher returns. 
this research examine the fair value effect as a whole 
as an information risk. A future research should separate 
out the two effects of fair value that is the measurement 
error and volatility effect on COE. Such research could 
be beneficial as it could differentiate the information risk 
aspect of quoted and unquoted fair value. one practical 
implication would be to improve the practice of fair value 
accounting in absence of quoted prices. consequently 
an investigation into mitigating factors, such as the 
role of disclosure or improved methods of fair value 
measurements would contribute to the practice of fair 
value accounting. 
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